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11  Introduction
The  view that  international  financial  market  integration  brings  significant
long-term  benefits  is hardly  a  controversial  one  among mainstream  econo-
mists.  Financial  openness,  for instance,  increases opportunities  for portfolio
risk diversification and consumption  smoothing through  borrowing and lend-
ing; and  producers  who are able to  diversify risks on world capital  markets
may  invest  in  more  risky  (and  higher-yield)  projects,  thereby  raising  the
country's  rate  of economic growth  (Obstfeld,  1994, 1998).  Increased  access
to  the domestic  financial system  by foreign banks  is often viewed as raising
the  efficiency of the  intermediation  process  between  savers  and  borrowers,
thereby  lowering the  cost  of investment.  Higher  foreign direct  investment
flows often  have a direct,  positive  effect on productivity  and  the  efficiency
of domestic  resource  utilization  (through  transfers  of technology  and  other
intangible  assets),  thereby  raising the rate  of economic growth.
But  it  is increasingly  recognized that  a  high  degree  of financial  open-
ness may entail  significant short-term  costs as well.  The magnitude  of the
capital  flows recorded by some developing countries  in recent  years and  the
abrupt  reversals  that  such  flows have  displayed  at  times  have raised  seri-
ous  concerns  among  policymakers.  The  Mexican  peso  crisis  of December
1994 led to financial instability  throughout  Latin  America,  particularly  so in
Argentina.  More recently, the  collapse of the  pegged exchange  rate  regime
in  Thailand  on July  2,  1997 led to  currency  turmoil  throughout  Asia,  par-
ticularly  in  Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  and  the  Philippines.  Both  events
illustrated  the growing tendency  for a crisis in one country to have contagion
or  spillover  effects on other  countries  where  similar  risk  and  vulnerability
factors  are perceived by financial markets  as being present-notably  real ex-
change rate  appreciation  and  growing current  account  deficits, large  stocks
of short-term  foreign-currency denominated  liabilities,  banking sector weak-
2nesses,  and  rapid  growth  in money and  domestic  credit.'  As  illustrated  in
Figure  1, external  interest  rate spreads  rose sharply  after the  collapse of the
Mexican  peso and  the Thai  baht.2
Several observers  have noted  that  the  magnitude  and  depth  of the  eco-
nomic crisis that  erupted  in Argentina in the aftermath  of the peso crisis, and
in Asia  after  the  collapse of the  Thai  baht,  were compounded  by domestic
banking  sector weaknesses.  These weaknesses include inefficient intermedi-
ation,  inadequate  lending  practices,  large volumes of nonperforming  loans,
excessive exposure to the  property  sector  (as was the case in Thailand),  un-
hedged short-term  liabilities in foreign currency, limited and  inaccurate  dis-
closure of financial statements  by borrowers, and ineffective supervision.  In a
previous paper  (Ag6nor and Aizenman,  1998) we examined the implications
of domestic  capital  market  imperfections  by considering  an  economy  char-
acterized  by a direct  link between bank  credit  and the  supply side  (through
firms' working capital needs) and a two-level financial intermediation  process:
domestic  banks were assumed to borrow at a premium on world capital  mar-
kets,  and domestic  agents to borrow at a premium  from domestic banks.  We
showed that  both  domestic and external financial intermediation  spreads  are
related  to  default  probabilities  and  underlying  domestic  shocks.  We then
defined contagion  as a mean-preserving increase in the volatility  of aggregate
shocks impinging  on the  domestic  economy and  argued  that,  to  the  extent
that  such  an increase  translates  into  a rise in the  probability  of default  on
existing  loan commitments,  domestic  and  foreign interest  rate  spreads  will
tend  to  rise, leading  to  a fall in output.  Thus,  our  analysis helped  to  iden-
tify a mechanism through  which financial market  imperfections may magnify
'Although  economic fundamentals in some of the Asian countries that  suffered from
contagion appeared stronger than in Thailand (notably in Korea, Malaysia, and the Philip-
pines), banking sector weaknesses  were a key characteristic of all of them.
2Evidence that  movements  in external spreads depend mainly on shifts in market sen-
timent rather  than shifts in fundamentals is provided by Eichengreen and Mody (1998),
in an analysis of data on a large number of developing-country  bonds (public and private)
launched during Jan.  1991-Dec. 1996.
3an  initial  exogenous shock.  It  also helped to  understand  the effects of mea-
sures aimed  at reducing  inefficiencies in the intermediation  process, such  as
a reduction  in the cost of contract  enforcement.
This  paper  extends  our  previous  work  to  examine  the  role  played  by
volatility  in assessing the  costs and  benefits of financial market  integration.
As in our earlier analysis, it combines the  costly state  verification  approach
pioneered  by  Townsend  (1979) and  the  model  of limited  enforceability  of
contracts  used frequently  in the external  debt  literature,  as  in Eaton  et al.
(1986), Bulow and  Rogoff (1989), and Helpman  (1989).3 Section II presents
the basic framework.  Section III  considers the  case of autarky,  in which do-
mestic  banks  have  access only to  domestic  savings  as a  source  of loanable
funds.  Section  IV focuses on the case in which financial  openness  leads to
free access to domestic capital  markets by foreign banks and to lower costs of
intermediation.  Section V derives the  welfare effects of capital  market  inte-
gration  by comparing welfare under financial autarky  and financial openness.
Section VI extends  the  basic framework to  consider the case of an upward-
slopping  domestic  supply  curve of funds.  Section VII summarizes  the main
results  of the  analysis and offers some concluding remarks.
2  The  Basic  FPamework
Our basic framework considers an economy in which risk-neutral  banks  pro-
vide  intermediation  services to  domestic  agents-producers  which  demand
credit  to finance their  investment  projects.4 The project's  future  productiv-
ity is random.  The realized productivity  shock is revealed to  banks  only  at
a cost.  If a producer  chooses to  default  on its  loan repayment  obligations,
3Limitations  in the ability of banks  to enforce the provisions of loan contracts  (including
seizure  of collateral)  has  been  viewed by some observers  as one  of the  key weaknesses  of
the  legal infrastructure  that  characterizes  many  of the  Asian countries  that  suffered from
contagion  in the  aftermath  of the  Thai  baht  crisis.
'More  specifically, only producers  who lack access to  the  equity  market  rely on  bank
credit  to finance  their  projects.
4the  bank seizes any collateral set as part of the loan contract,  plus a fraction
t.  of the project's  value.  Seizing involves two types  of costs.  First,  verifying
the  net worth  of the  project  is costly; second, enforcing repayment  requires
costly recourse to  the legal system.
We start  with  the  simplest  case,  in  which  all projects  are identical  ex
ante, and of the same scale.  Investment  H in project  i yields (future)  output
of
Yi  = M(l  + ei),  leil < U < 1,  i = 1, ...n,  (1)
where Ei is the realized productivity  shock. 5 Equation  (1) can be viewed as a
reduced  form which relates  a variable input,  M, to output.  For simplicity, we
assume a Ricardian  technology, and take the price of input  M is as constant
and normalized  to  unity.
Again for simplicity, we assume that  producers  cannot  issue claims on fu-
ture  output  and  cannot  pledge collateral.6 Let rE be the contractual  interest
rate;  producer i will default if repayment  in the event of default,  KM(1 + &i),
is less than  contractual  repayment,  (1 + rL)H:
i'M(1  +  ±i)  <  (1 + rL)H.  (2)
Let E* denote  the highest  value of the  productivity  shock leading  to  de-
fault,  that  is
IM  ( 1 + £i ) =  (1 + r)H,  (3)
5Note that  there  is no aggregate risk in our model.  All firms are identical and  the
productivitiy shock ei is uncorrelated among them.
6We also ignore the  possibility of randomized monitoring.  The key results  of our
analysis would continue to hold in this case as long as implementation and enforcement
of loan contracts involves real costs, as implied by the results of Bernanke and  Gertler
(1989) and Boyd and  Smith (1994). In the Bernanke-Gertler framework, for instance,
loan contracts under random monitoring involve also a schedule  specifying  the probability
of monitoring as a function of the output announced by the borrower. They show that the
monitoring probability is positive for a low  value of declared output, depending negatively
on the announced output.  Thus, random monitoring does not negate the need to engage
in costly verification of the realized state of nature.
5which implies that
e  =  (1 + r±  )H/lM  -1,  (4)
which shows that,  for Et  to be negative,  expected output,  M,  times x, must
exceed contractual  repayment.
If default  never occurs, E*  is set at the lower end of the support  (Et =  -U).
In  case of default,  the  bank's  revenue on its  loan to  producer  i,  IIi,  is the
producer's  repayment  minus the state  verification  and  contract  enforcement
cost,  Ci,7
Hij  = rM(1  + Ei) - Ci.  (5)
3  Financial  Autarky
Under financial autarky,  domestic banks have access to only a given amount
of domestic  funds,  S,  at  a real  cost  of  rA. 8 Banks  are  risk  neutral,  and
compete  in  a  manner  akin to  monopolistic  competition.  This  assumption
about  market  structure  is captured  by postulating  a mark-up  pricing  rule,
whereby  banks  demand  the  expected  yield on  their  loanable  funds  (net  of
7C is a lump-sum  cost paid by banks in order to identify the productivity shock ei, and
to enforce proper repayment. The analysis would  be more involved  if some costs were paid
after  obtaining  the  information  about  Ei.  In  these  circumstances,  banks  would  refrain
from  forcing  debt  repayment  when  the  realized  productivity  is below  an  "enforcement
threshold."  For  simplicity  of exposition,  we refrain  from  modeling  this  possibility.  We
ignore  also  all  other  real  costs  associated  with  financial  intermediation.  Adding  these
considerations  would  not modify  the  key insight  of our  analysis.
8More specifically, we asume  that  the  domestic  supply  of funds  is perfectly  elastic  up
to  a given ceiling.  We are also  assuming that  the  demand  for credit  is never  constrained.
These  assumptions  rule out  the  possibility  of credit  rationing  due  to  supply  shortage,  a
possibility  modeled  by Williamson  (1986, 1987). The  key results  in Sections  III  to V can
be  shown to hold even if the  supply of saving is upward sloping, as long as it is sufficient to
finance  existing projects  at  an interest  rate  rA that  is not prohibitively  high.  Sections  VI
and  VII  extend  our  discussion to consider  the  case in which  the  supply  curve of domestic
funds  is positively  related  to interest  rates.
6enforcement  costs)  to  be  OA(1  + rA),  where  OA  >  1i9  Consequently,  the
contractual  interest  rate  is determined  by the break-even  condition:
OA(1 + rA)H  [(l + r)H]f(-)de  + L  [IcM(1  + ei)-Ci]f(E)dE,  (6)
where  f (e)  is the  density function  of E.  Equation  (6) can be rewritten  as
OA(l+rA)H  =  (1+rD)H-J  [(1±+r)H-KM(l+Ei)]f(e)dE-Ci  |  f(e)dE.
Substituting  (3) for (1 + rE)H in the second term  on the right-hand  side
of the  above equation  and rearranging  yields the interest  rate  spread  as
KM f~ (i  - ))de~  Ci  f  fE)d*7
1 + rL = OA(1 +  rA) +  H  +  U  (7)
Equation  (7)  shows that  the  (gross)  contractual  interest  rate  is deter-
mined by a mark-up  rule, which exceeds the  bank's  net return  on its  funds
by the  sum  of two terms.  The  first  term,  KM fl(E'!  - e)f(E)dE/H,  is the
expected  revenue  lost  due  to  partial  default  in  bad  states  of nature.  The
second term,  Ci fJ! f (E)de/H,  measures the expected  state  verification  and
contract  enforcement  costs.
\  The producer's  expected  net  income under  autarky  is equal to  expected
output,  M, minus expected repayment  in  "good" and  "bad" states  of nature:
M-|  j[(1  + rL)H]f  (e)de  - KMr  (1  ± s1)f(e)de.  (8)
Applying  (6), we can simplify (8) to
M  - OA(1  + rA)H  -C  f  (E)de.  (9)
Using (5), the  domestic bank's  expected net income is equal to expected
repayment  in  "good" and  "bad"  states  of nature,  minus the cost  of enforce-
ment  in bad states  of nature  and mninus  repayment  of principal with  interest
9See Sussman (1993) for a model where the markup is derived endogenously for an
economy where the cost of financial intermediation increases with the producer's distance
from the bank.
7at the  rate  rA to lenders of funds:
U
(1 + rL)H]  f(E,)dE + ][nM(1  +e)  - C]f(e)de  -(1  +  rA)H.  (10)
Using (6) and  (10) the bank's  expected net  income can be written  as
(1 + rA)(OA - 1)H.  (11)
4  Financial  Openness
Economists  often claim that  financial openness,  by providing free access by
foreign banks  to  domestic  capital  markets,  often lead to  an  increase  in the
degree of efficiency of the financial intermediation  process (by lowering costs
and  "excessive" profits)-thereby  lowering the  cost  of investment  and  im-
proving  resource  allocation.  Levine  (1996),  for instance,  has  argued  that
foreign banks  may
- improve the  quality  and  availability of financial services in the domes-
tic financial market  by increasing bank  competition,  and  enabling the
application  of more sophisticated  banking techniques  and technology;
- serve to stimulate  the development of the underlying  bank supervisory
and  legal framework;
*  enhance  a country's  access to international  capital.
Surprisingly  enough, there is relatively limited  evidence supporting  these
claims.  A recent  study  by Claessens,  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Huizinga  (1998)
provides the most  systematic  attempt  to  date to  analyze empirically the cost
and  profitability  effects of foreign banks,  in both  developed  and  developing
countries.  Some of the data  used by Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt  and Huizinga
8is summarized  in Figures  2 to  5.1O Figures  2, 3 and  4 suggest  that  in  de-
veloped countries  foreign banks have lower net interest  margins-defined  as
net interest  income divided by total  assets-lower  overhead costs, and lower
profitability  than  domestic  banks.  The  evidence for  developing  countries,
however, is somewhat  mixed.  Figure  5 suggests  that  increased  penetration
of foreign banks  in the domestic  banking system of developing countries-as
measured  by either  the importance  of foreign banks in terms of numbers  and
in  terms  of assets-is  associated  with  a reduction  in  both  profitability  and
overhead  costs for domestic  banks." 1 The econometric  evidence provided  by
Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt  and Huizinga  corroborate  these last  two findings
in a more rigorous way.
To capture  in a  formal sense the  evidence that  foreign banks  are more
efficient than  domestic  banks  (due  to  either  experience  or scale effects) we
assume  that  the  loan  enforcement  and  supervision  costs  faced  by  foreign
banks,  measured  by C*, may differ from the  costs faced by domestic banks,
C.  Financial  openness  is also assumed  to  be  associated  with  more intense
competition, which leads to  a drop in the markup  from OA to  Go <  OA,  and
to  a change in the supply  cost of savings from rA  to ro  < rA.  Hence,1 2
G  J GA in autarky  r  rA in autarky
00 <  GA  under  openness  ro  <  rA under  openness
With  financial openness, the break-even  condition  of foreign banks oper-
ating  in the  domestic economy is given by an equation  analogous to  (6):
Go(l + ro)H  =  ][(1  + r')H]f(E)de  + Ji  [KM(1  + Ei) - C*]f(e)de,  (12)
10The  sample  considered  by  Claessens,  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Huizinga  in  their  study
relates  to bank-level  data  for 80 countries  (developed  and  developing)  covering the  period
1988-95, with about  7900 individual  commercial bank  observations.  The source of the data
is IBCA,  Europe's  largest  credit  rating  agency.  The  data  shown in  Figures  2-6 exclude
transition  countries  from  the  original  sample.  A bank  is said  to  be  foreign-owned  if  50
percent  or  more of its  capital  is owned by foreign residents.
The  effect on net  interest  margins,  by contrast,  is not significant.
12Note  that  we do not  make  any  assumption  regarding  the  value of  C*relative  to  the
costs faced by  domestic  banks,  C.  See the  discussion below.
9and the  interest  rate  spread  analogous to  (7) is given by
o(l + ro) +  M  (6  -)f()d  f()de  (13) I + rL  ~H  +  H  (3
We assume that,  in line with the literature  on limit-pricing theory  (see for
instance,  Milgrom and Roberts,  1982), the threat  of entry by foreign banks
forces domestic banks to  charge to domestic borrowers the interest  rate  that
foreign banks would potentially  charge them.  Hence, the contractual  interest
rate  rL  is determined  by (the threat  of entry of) foreign banks.  The dometic
bank's  expected  net income is now
(1 + rL)H  f (E)d  + |  M(1  + Ei) - C]f (£)de-  (1 + ro)H,  (14)
with  rL  determined  by (13), instead  of the break-even  condition  (6).
The producer's  expected  net income equals
M-  /j[(1  + rE)H]f(E)de  - M |M  (1 + ei)f(6)dE.  (15)
Applying  (12), we can simplify (15) to
M  - 0o(l  + rO)H  - C*  f (e)d£.  (16)
Suppose that  the  shock E follows a uniform  distribution,  so that  -U  <
e < U.  The spread  (13) is in this  case characterized  by a quadratic  equation
1 + rL  y=o(1  + ro)  UM 2 +  H4,  (17)
H  ±  H
where  4j,  given by  Ii  =  f  f(E)de  =  (U + e*)/2U, is the  probability  of
default.
The second term of (17) is illustrative  of how producers  pay for the infor-
mation  asymmetry  through  the banks'  mark-up  rule.  Combining  equations
(3),  (15) and  (17), the  contractual  interest  rate  can be solved for as a func-
tion  of the  banks'  cost  of funds.  In  general, this  curve is nonlinear,  and  in
the  case of a uniform distribution  for E it is quadratic:
C*
Oo(l + ro)  + qfg(r')'  +  fg(  -(1r +4  (  )  = 0,  (18)
10where T  =  UKM/H  and
g rL)=1  1  +1+rL
2  2U  2'I'
It  can be inferred  from (18) that
drL  00  (19)
dro  4i  + (C*/2HxP) -1(
Further  insight regarding  (19) can be inferred from Figure 6, which relates
repayment  to the value of the productivity  shock, E.  Curve BB  (respectively
AA) corresponds  to the left-hand  side (respectively right-hand  side) of equa-
tion  (2).  The intersection  of these curves determines  6*. The probability  of
repayment  is determined  by the  length  of the  segment  UE*, normalized  by
2U.  Curve A'A'  corresponds to  a marginal  increase in the  contractual  inter-
est rate  by ArL.  A higher interest rate  affects the bank's  expected repayment
in two opposite  directions.  On the one hand,  expected repayment  increases
by the shaded  area  (which represents  the increase in the  value to be repaid
in good states  of nature,  at a given level of the demand  for loans) normalized
by 2U-an  area which is also equal to the  probability  of repayment,  1 -i,
because  4>i is the  probability  of default-times  HA\rL.  On the  other,  ex-
pected  repayment  falls as a result  of the increase  in expected intermediation
costs, which is equal to  C* times  [(dE*/drL)/2UIArL.`3 The net  increase in
expected repayment  is thus  given by
{r2U  drLL}
FRom (4), de*/drL  =  H/InM  > 0.  Substituting  this  result  in  the  above
expression yields
{(1  - Q-C2UM  I  HArL  (20)
13Recall  from  the  previous  discussion  that  (Di =  (U +  ei*)/2U.  Thus,  dDi/drL  =
(2U)l'de  /drL.
11Hence, the  condition  for observing ArL/ArO  > 0 is that,  for  (i  =  0:
1-  C  > 
2UicM
or equivalently C*/2U  < KM.  Thus, if the foregoing condition  is satisfied, we
will observe an upward-sloping  portion  for the  contractual  interest  rate/cost
of loanable  funds curve.
Suppose that  this  condition  is met.  If KM(1 - U) < HOo(1 + ro),  then
(given the  definition of Et given above)  U + 6!  >  0 and  the  probability  of
default,  4,i, will be positive.  In these circumstances  the interest  rate/cost  of
credit  curve is backward bending,  as shown in Figure  7. In this  figure, point
M  is reached  when the term  in brackets  in (20) is zero.
With  a  low level  of bank  funding  cost,  if we also  have  KM(1  - U)  >
HOo(1 + ro),  then (Di,  the probability  of default,  will be zero-as  is the  case
along portion  KL  in Figure  7 where, as implied by the break-even  condition
(17) with  ,i =  0,
1  L+r"  =o(l+ro).
At  a high  enough  level of the  banks'  funding  cost  (and  thus  of the  con-
tractual  lending  rate),  producers  will default  in  the worst  states  of nature,
as is the  case if
ro  Ž  ro0=  M(l  - U)/OH  - 1.
The point  at which ro  =  ?O corresponds to  point  L in Figure  7. Beyond
ro,  a further increase in the banks'  funding cost would increase the probabil-
ity of default,  leading to an increasing risk premium  and a higher contractual
rate,  moving along portion  LM.  Equation  (19) implies that,  moving above
point L, the slope of the curve increases as the probability  of default rise.  At
a high enough  cost of funding on world capital  markets,  the  economy would
reach  point  M  (at  which point  ro  =  io),  where  further  rises in  the banks'
funding  cost would make the  project  unfeasible.  This  will happen  because
a higher contractual  lending rate  reduces the probability  of repayment,  and
12at point  M further  increases in this  rate  raises the probability  of default  at
a rate  that  is high enough to reduce  expected repayment.  It  can be verified
that  interest  rates  at  point M  are given by" 4
L-M(l  + U)-C*  (c* 2/4UiM) + KM - C  1  (21)
rL=-  H  1  =OH  . 21
In general, given that  changes in the cost of funds affects expected repay-
ment in two opposite directions  (as discussed earlier) there  are two domestic
contractual  rates  associated  with  each level of ro.  The high  interest  rate  is
also  associated  with  a  low probability  of repayment.  We will assume  that
competitive  forces will prevent the inefficient equilibrium associated  with op-
erating  on the backward-bending  portion of the curve (segment MN).  Equa-
tion  (21) implies that  higher  domestic volatility-an  increase  in  U-would
shift  point  M  upward and to  the left.  This is confirmed by the dotted  curve
in Figure  7, with  point  M shifting to  point  M'."5
5  Welfare  Effects  of  Financial  Integration
We turn  now to  an evaluation  of the dependency  of domestic welfare on the
foreign interest  rate.  Our  welfare criterion  is the  sum  of the  expected  net
income  of domestic  producers  and  domestic  banks,  and  the  net  surplus  of
domestic  savers. We assume throughout  this  section that  domestic  saving is
"It  can be inferred from (21) that
S(dro)  =  sg(  C*  _  1)  <0,  Sg(d  °0) = -sg([  CM  - 1) >  O,
given the  condition  derived earlier for generating  an upward-sloping  portion  for the  curve
linking  rL  and  ro.  Higher  enforcement  and  verification  costs,  for  instance,  lower the
threshold  level of the  funding  cost  above which lending  becomes  unfeasible.
15As noted  earlier,  banks  are assumed to operate  only (as a result  of efficiency considera-
tions)  on the  upward-sloping  portion  of this curve.  It can be verified that  if C*/2U  > KcM,
a credit  ceiling will be reached at  the lowest level of loans associated  with  default.  In these
circumstances  the  supply curve  has  an  inverted  L shape.  This would  occur  if verification
costs are too large to be recovered, in which case banks  would not supply credit  levels that
would lead  to default  in some states  of nature.
13exogenously  given at a level S, with S > H with a reservation price of saving
of 1 +rA.
Consider first the case of financial autarky. Net expected income of do-
mestic producers is given by Equation (9), that  is, under the assumption of
a uniform distribution, by
M-OA(l+rA)H-C  A,  (22)
where  -A  =  fi  de/2U is the probability  of default  under  autarky.
Using (10), expected net income of domestic banks under the assumption
of a uniform distribution is given by
(1-  (A)(1 + rL)H  +  f|  [J  M(1 + ei)  - C]&  - (1  + rA)H,
where 1 -4A  = fru  de/2U is the probability of repayment under autarky.
As shown  earlier (equation (11)), expected income  of banks under autarky
is given by (1 + rA)(OA  -1)H.  Finally, the net surplus of domestic savers
under autarky, given the assumption of a reservation gross rate of return of
1 + rA, is (1 + rA)H  - (1 + rA)H  = 0. Collecting terms, domestic welfare  in
autarky can be written as:
M - A(1 + rA)H  - CBA
WA=  +(1 + rA)(OA-1)H  = M-(1  + rA)H-CBA.  (23)
+0
Consider now the  case of financial openness.  As indicated earlier, we
assume that,  following  financial integration, competitive forces bid up the
interest rate facing domestic savers to the international level of ro.  Suppose
first that  following  the liberalization all projects are still financed domesti-
cally, at an interest rate that reflects the integrated equilibrium. Hence, the
threat  of foreign intermediation suffices  to  reduce the  contractual interest
rate that  prevails in the financially-closed  economy  to the level dictated by
international market conditions.
14Net  expected  income of domestic producers  is now
M-o(l  + ro)H  -C*4o,
where  'J0  is the  probability  of default  under  openness.  It  is easy to  verify
that,  as long as the assumption  that  rA > ro  holds initially, the incidence of
default  is lower under  openness than  under  autarky  (bo  <  <>A).
To calculate  the net  expected income of domestic banks  under  openness
proceeds  as follows.  If all the  effective financial intermediation  is done  by
domestic  banks,  then  the  cost  C is the  effective cost  of intermediation  for
welfare calculation  (see equation  (14)).  As also noted  above, under  financial
openness  the  cost  of credit  facing domestic  borrowers  is determined  by the
entry  threat  of foreign banks;  as a  result,  domestic  banks  will charge  the
interest  rate  determined  by (13). Using equations  (13) and  (14), we have
{Oo(  + ro)  -(1  + ro)}H-  (C-C*)>o.
Note  that  the threat  of foreign competition  induces banks  to  absorb the
gap between their intermediation  cost and that  of foreign banks; this  implies
that  their  expected  profits  will be  lower than  that  of foreign banks  by the
quantity (C - C*)4?o.
Finally, the net surplus  of domestic  savers is now
(1 +ro)S-  (1 + rA)S  =  (ro-rA)S.
Collecting terms,  domestic welfare under  openness is thus
M-0o(1  + ro)H-C*-o
+{0o(  + ro)  - (1 + ro)}H-  (C-C*)4o  if ro  < to
+(ro  - rA)S
1470=  (24)
0
+(o-  rFA)S  i  0 >~
15or, after  rearranging  terms,
M-(1  + ro)H-C  o  +  (ro-rA)S  if ro  < to,
wo =  (25)
(ro-rA)S  if ro  >  0 .
The  first  three  panels  in  Figure  8 depict  the  relationship  between  net
expected  income  for each  category  of agents  and  the  foreign interest  rate,
ro.  The figures show that  higher bank funding costs reduce the net expected
income of domestic  producers,  as this  implies both  higher cost of credit  and
more frequent  incidence of costly default.  Banks'  welfare has an inverted  U
shape  with a linear segment-higher  interest  rates  raise net expected income
for a given incidence of default,  and increases the frequency of default.  Savers
are unambiguously  better  off.
The change in domestic welfare under openness resulting  from an increase
in the  world interest  rate  is given by, from (25):
awo  _  (S-H)-c(aQ 0 /arO)  if ro <  i 0 ,
aro  S  if ro  > ro
where it  can be verified that  N 0O/aro > 0. The lower panel on the  right in
Figure  8 illustrates  the relation  between net welfare and  the banks'  funding
cost,  under  the  assumption  that  (S  - H)  - C(04O/9ro)  < 0.  The  figure
shows that  welfare is concave in ro  for ro  <  Po and  experiences a  discrete
downward jump  for ro  re,.
We infer  the  welfare  effects of financial  integration  by  comparing  the
welfare levels under  financial  autarky  to  those  achieved under  openness,  as
defined above.  Applying  (24) and  (23) we infer that  the welfare gain from
financial  integration,  AW  = Wo  - WA, is
C(DA - 4o)  +  (ro  -rA)(S  -H)  if ro  < r0,
\W  =  <  . (26)
-(M-(1+rA)H-C'DA)+(ro-rA)S  ifrO>PO
The  above expression  shows that  if the  interest  rate  facing the  country
is sufficiently low, financial integration  will be  accompanied  with  a welfare
16gain due to the fall in (expected) intermediation  costs associated with a lower
probability  of default,  as well as the increase  in the  net surplus  of domestic
savers  attributed  to  the  higher  interest  rate  on  saving  net  of investment.
However, if the  interest  rate  facing the  country  is relatively  high,  projects
will become  unfeasible,  leading to  a loss of the  entire  expected  net  income
of domestic  producers  in that  state  of nature.  The limited  ability of lenders
to enforce the provisions of loan contracts  prevents the financing of domestic
projects,  despite the fact that  they may lead to  a large expected  net income.
To illustrate  the  impact  of volatility  on  welfare, suppose  that  the  only
source of macroeconomic uncertainty  is fluctuations  in the world interest  rate,
ro,  whose degree of volatility may be affected by global conditions,  as well as
contagion  effects induced by events occurring  in, say, neighboring  countries.
Specifically, suppose that  the foreign interest  rate  fluctuates  between  r* + 6
and  r  - 6, each state  with probability  one half, that  is,
r* + 6  with prob.  0.5
rO  =
r  - 6  with prob. 0.5
This  specification  implies  a  monotonic  relationship  between  changes in
6 and  increased  volatility.  Let  (o' 1To=r,+ (respectively  (Do  1K=, -,) denote
the  value of the  probability  of default  when ro  =  r* + 6 (respectively  rO -
r-  6).  The expected value of 4o,  EDo, is given by
EDO =  0.5(4)oIro=r*+ 6 +  4'OIro=r*-6)
Using  (25), we have {  M-(1  + r*)H-CE''o  + (r* -rA)S  if 6 <  iO  -r
wo=
0.[-1+HC  (O,o=r;6]  + (r*-  rA)S  if 6>  r-r,
This  equation  implies that,  at  6 =  ro-  r,  welfare drops by
0.5[M - (1 + r* + 5)H - C  "DOro=r+ 6
17Domestic  welfare is plotted  in Figure  9.  As shown in the figure, as long
as 6 <O  - r*,  higher volatility reduces welfare by a second-order magnitude
due  to  the  convexity  of the  welfare function.  If 6  >  ro  - rb,  by  contrast,
volatility  induces a potentially  large welfare loss, as it leads to  a fall in  do-
mestic  investment  in bad  states  of nature,  when the  foreign interest  rate  is
high.  This  is because,  as  indicated  earlier,  projects  become  unfeasible  in
bad  states  of nature,  leading  to  a loss of the  entire  expected  net  income of
domestic  producers.  Figure  9 shows that  if welfare under  financial  autarky
is at level FA,  financial openness is welfare improving only  if the  volatility
of the foreign interest  rate  is sufficiently low.
The foregoing discussion can thus be summarized  by the following propo-
sition:
Proposition  1  Financial integration  may  be welfare reducing if the foreign
interest  rate facing  the  economy  under  openness  is  more  volatile  than  the
interest  rate that prevails under financial  autarky.
It is worth emphasizing that  the above results  do not  depend on C* being
either  greater  or lower than  C,  the enforcement  and  verification  costs faced
by domestic  banks.  For instance,  the welfare gain from financial integration,
as  given by  (26),  does not  depend  on  C*.  This  is important  because,  in
the  present  model-in  which,  despite  the threat  of entry  by foreign banks,
financial  intermediation  is actually  conducted  by domestic  banks-whether
C* is greater  or lower than  C  cannot  be  established  a  priori.  It  may  be
argued, in particular,  that  although foreign banks may face lower monitoring
costs than  domestic  banks  (as a result  of, say, better  screening technologies
for loan applications),  domestic  banks  may face lower enforcement  costs  as
a result  of a privileged relationship  with domestic  law enforcement agencies.
186  Endogenous  Supply  of Funds
Our  framework  can  be  extended  to  allow for an  upward-sloping  domestic
supply curve of saving,  and by assuming  ex ante heterogeneity  of projects-
which  translates  into  heterogeneity  of loan  contracts  as well.  Specifically,
suppose that  the  domestic saving function  is given by
S = S(r),  S'  > O.  (27)
The production  function is now given by a modified version of (1).  Specif-
ically, we now assume  that  although  projects  continue  to  be  of the  same
scale-requiring  a lump-sum investment  of H  to be implemented-they  are
ex ante heterogeneous,  and  are ranked according to  their  productivity:
Yi=  M(i)(l  + Ei);  M(i)  >  M(i  + 1),  (28)
where  n is the  total  number  of projects,  which is determined  endogenously
below.  We assume  that,  ex  ante,  banks  do  not  observe  the  productivity
of producer  i.  hence,  banks  cannot  discriminate  among  producers  and  are
offering the  same interest  rate  for.  Consequently, the  probability  of default
from the point of view of the various producers varies, being higher for higher
i.  To simplify notations,  we will denote  by 4>(i) the  probability  of default
of producer  i,  and  by  1 the  average  probability  of default.  This  average
probability  of default  is the  one  that  determines  the  expected  repayment
from the  point of view of domestic banks.
The closed-economy equilibrium is characterized by two conditions.  First,
the  expected  rent  of the  marginal  producer  (denoted  by  nA)  is dissipated.
Second,  the  domestic  supply  of saving finances  the  investment.  These two
conditions  are
M(nA)  =OA(1 + rA)H  + C4A(nA),  S(rA)  =  nAH,  (29)
or, alternatively,
M(nA)  - CDA(nA)  - 1 +  rA,  S(rA)  =fnAH,  (30)
OAH
19where  S(rA)  is the  supply  curve of domestic  savings,  denoted  SS  in  what
follows.
For simplicity of exposition,  we normalize  H to  unity and  ignore integer
constraints  implied by the ranking procedure used in (28). Figure  10 provides
a diagrammatic  analysis of welfare under financial autarky.  Curve DD  plots
the  combinations  of (n, 1 +  rA) that  satisfy  the  left-hand  side  of the  first
equation  in (30), the marginal producer's  expected output  net of enforcement
costs, divided (with H =  1) by the markup, that  is [M(nA)-C 4 A(nA)]/OA.  It
defines the  demand  for saving (or loanable funds) by domestic banks.  Curve
AA  magnifies  DD  by the  markup-that  is,  it  is  the  marginal  producer's
expected  output  net  of enforcement costs, M(nA)  - CDA(nA).  The area BS
corresponds  to expected  banks'  rents,  PS  to the producer's  surplus, and DS
to  saver's  surplus.
The  scale  of production,  nA, is  determined  by  the  intersection  of the
demand  for saving, DD,  with the supply curve,  SS.  Note that  the  expected
producers'  surplus is given by
XA  M(i)di  - nA[CDA  +  OA(l  +  rA)].  (31)
Hence, the expected surplus of producer i is M(i)  - C0A(i)  - OA(1 + rA)-
Under financial openness, the equilibrium condition  (29) becomes (again,
with  H  =  1):
M(no)  =  Oo(i + ro)  + C*41O(no).  (32)
Figure  11, drawn  for  the  case in  which  all  domestic  intermediation  is
actually  done  by  domestic  banks  (as assumed  earlier),  evaluates  domestic
welfare in the  open  economy.  The  upper  panel  corresponds  to  the  case in
which  the  cost  of credit  is relatively  high,  whereas  the  lower panel  depicts
the case in which the cost of credit is relatively low. Opening the economy to
financial  flows has the effect of shifting both  AA and DD  to  new positions,
which correspond to  the dashed  curves A'A' and D'D'.  The position of these
curves relative to that  in autarky  is affected by the change in the probability
20of default.  If the  cost  of foreign capital  is relatively  low, it will reduce  the
incidence  of default,  and  will shift  both  curves  upward.  This  is  depicted
in  the  lower  panel.  The  availability  of intermediation  services  at  a  lower
monitoring  cost  shifts  curve AA upward,  to  A'A'.  The  fall in  the  markup
rate  and the  reduction  in monitoring  costs shift  curve DD  also upward,  to
D'D'.  Assuming that  banks  have access to  capital  at  a  cost of 1 + ro,  the
domestic  interest  rate  facing savers  drops from  r  =  rA to  r  =  ro.  In this
particular  case,  the  surplus  of domestic  savers  drops,  as the  interest  rate
falls.  The  net  outcome  for  domestic  banks  is  ambiguous-the  volume  of
intermediation  has  increased  but  the  markup  has  declined;  and  banks  are
absorbing  the  domestic-foreign  monitoring  and  enforcement  cost  gap.  The
net  expected  income  of domestic  producers  unambiguously  increases,  as  a
result  of the  fall in the  cost of financing  and  the  rise in output.' 6 Overall,
domestic  welfare will increase.
Formally, from  (31) we infer that  the  net  expected  income of producers
under  financial openness  is
J M(i)di  - no[C*4o  + Oo(1  + ro)].
Assuming  again  that  all  intermediation  is  actually  done  by  domestic
banks,  their  net expected  income is
no[C*Do  + Oo(1 + ro)]  - no[C0o  + (1 + ro)].
Adding the net  expected income of producers  and banks  yields
jf  M(i)di  - no[C'Io + (1 + ro)].
Hence, the marginal  social benefit  of project  n, obtained  by deriving the
above expression  with  respect to  n, is
16As discussed below, however,  in the presence  of congestion effects the surplus of do-
inestic producers would be also affected in an opposite direction: greater congestion  would
tend to reduce net expected income. Figure 11 azsumes that  C = Ct.
21- -nC-  + M(n)  - [C(o  + (1 + ro)].  (33)
Thus,  the socially-optimal  number of projects,  no,  is determined  by
M(no)  - o-noC-  =  1 + ro,  (34)
an
from which it can be shown that  no  > nA in the lower panel of Figure  11.
By contrast,  if financial integration  increases the cost  of funds to  a high
level, it would ultimately  increase the probability  of partial  default,  shifting
both  curves inward; this  is the case depicted in the upper  panel of Figure  11.
In this  case, domestic  welfare will unambiguously  fall.
7  Congestion  Externalities
The foregoing discussion can be further  extended  to consider jointly  the case
of endogenous domestic savings and congestion externalities.  In the presence
of such externalities,  output  is now determined  by, instead  of (28):
Yi = M(i)n-'(1  +£Ei);  M(i) > M(i + 1),  (35)
where  a  >  0  measures  the  intensity  of congestion.  The  conditions  that
characterize  the  closed-economy equilibrium  are now given by, with  H =  1:
nA  M(nA)  C-A(fA)  =  1 +  rA,  S(rA)  =  nA,  (36)
OA
where  S(rA)  is again the  supply curve of domestic savings under  autarky.
The upper  panel in Figure  12 provides a diagrammatic  analysis of welfare
in the  closed economy.  Curve  DD  plots,  as before,  the  demand  for saving
by domestic  banks,  that  is, the quantity  [n-aM(nA)  - C4A(nA)]/OA.  Curve
AA magnifies  DD by the  markup,  and  is given by n-'M(nA)  - C4A.  The
scale of production,  nA, is again determined  by the  intersection  of DD  and
Ss.
22The expected  producers'  surplus  is now given by
nA  Yn  M(i)di  - nA[C4A  + OA(1  + rA)].  (37)
Hence, the expected surplus of producer  i is n-fM(i)  - C4A(i)  - OA(1 +
rA), for i =  1,...nA.  Curve  00  depicts producer  i's  expected  output  net  of
enforcement costs, plotted  for the closed-economy equilibrium,  where n =  nA
(it corresponds to n-'M(nA)  - COA(nA)  - GA(1  + rA)).  As before, area DS
is the savers'  (or depositors')  surplus, area BS  is the bank's  surplus,  and area
PS  is the  expected  producers'  surplus.
Under financial openness, the equilibrium  condition  (29) becomes  (again,
with  H=  1):
noaM(no)  ='9o(1 + ro) + C*5o(no).  (38)
The lower panel in Figure  12 evaluates domestic welfare in the open econ-
omy,  drawn  for the  case in  which  all  domestic  intermediation  is  done  by
domestic  banks.  The availability  of intermediation  services at  a lower mon-
itoring  cost again  shifts curve AA upward,  to  A'A'.  The fall in the  markup
rate  and  the  reduction  in monitoring  costs shift  curve DD  also upward,  to
D'D'.  With  banks'  cost of capital equal to  1 + ro,  the domestic interest  rate
facing savers drops  from r  =  rA  to  r  =  ro.  The surplus  of domestic  savers
drops,  as the interest  rate  goes down.
The position  of domestic  banks  is ambiguous-the  volume of intermedi-
ation  has increased,  but  the  markup  has declined,  and banks  are absorbing
the  domestic-foreign  monitoring  and  enforcement  cost gap.  The  surplus  of
domestic  producers  is now affected in two opposite  directions:  on the  one
hand,  greater  congestion  reduces the  surplus;  on the  other,  the  fall in  the
cost of financing  and the rise in output  increase the surplus.  In the  absence
of congestion  effects,  as shown  earlier,  the  expected  surplus  would unam-
biguously  increase; but  in the presence of such effects, the  overall impact  is
ambiguous.
23Figure  13 focuses on the production  inefficiency contributed  by congestion
externalities.  From  (37) we infer that  the expected  producers'  surplus under
financial  openness is
noj  M(i)di  - no[C"4o +  Oo(1 + ro)].
Assuming  that  all intermediation  is done  by domestic  banks,  their  ex-
pected  surplus  is
no[C* 4o  + Oo(1 + ro)]  - no[C1O  + (1 + ro)]
Adding the  producers'  and  banks'  surpluses, we infer that  the  combined
surplus  is
no-  L M(i)di  - no[C0o + (1 + ro)].
Hence, the marginal  social benefit  of project  n, obtained  by deriving the
above expression with  respect  to n, is
n(+)  M(i)di + nCo-J  + n--M(n)  - [C 0 o + (1 + ro)].  (39)
Thus,  the socially optimal  level of n is determined  by
- - -~(1+a  n  a0D  (40
n-'M(no)  -C  ODO-  anO(l+  M(i)di-  noC-  =  1+  ro.  (40) n0Mno  40 a 0 ao  n
Curve  SMB  in Figure  13 traces  the  left-hand  side of equation  (34).  In
the  financially-open  economy the  optimal  level of investment  (that  is,  the
optimal  number  of projects)  is where  the  SMB  curve equals  the  cost  of
funds,  1 +  ro.  Borrowing  under  financial  openness  is determined  by  the
intersection  of curve D'D'  with the banks'  funding cost,  1 + ro,  determining
no.  Hence, unregulated  foreign borrowing results  in a welfare cost given by
the shaded  triangle.  Recall that  under financial autarky,  n =  nA  (determined
by  the  intersection  of SS  and  DD).  This  implies  that  opening  domestic
capital  markets  may lead to  a fall in welfare relative to  financial  autarky  if
24congestion  effects are relatively  large  (that  is,  if a  is large).  The  implied
welfare loss tends  to be larger  when the  supply curve of domestic  savings is
relatively  inelastic,  and  when the  country faces a relatively  elastic supply  of
credit  with integrated  capital markets.
Figure  13 illustrates  a more general principle of second best theory, which
can be summarized  in the following proposition:
Proposition  2  Increased financial integration  may magnify the welfare cost
of existing  distortions.
In autarky,  the welfare cost of the distortion  was, in a sense, "contained"
by  the  limited  pool  of domestic  saving.  In  our  example,  the  distortion  is
due  to  congestion  externalities,  which  are magnified by  increased  financial
openness.  A similar  assessment  would  apply  to  other  distortions,  such  as
the implicit  insurance  (or bailout  guarantee)  that  regulatory  authorities  may
provide to domestic  banks.
8  Summary  and  Conclusions
The events that  followed the Mexican peso crisis in December  1994 and those
of the  past  year in  Asia have prompted  many  economists  to reconsider  the
costs, benefits,  and sustainability  of capital  account  liberalization  and finan-
cial integration  with  world capital markets.  The contribution  of this paper-
which dwells on the  analysis provided by Agenor and  Aizenman  (1998)-to
this  ongoing  process  has  been to  focus on the  links  between  capital  flows,
the  financial system,  and  the  supply  side of the  economy, using a model  in
which  state  verification  is costly  and  the  enforcement  of the  provisions  of
loan  contracts  is limited.  Section II presented  the  basic framework,  which
assumes  that  productivity  shocks are random.  We then  considered the  case
of financial  autarky,  in which  domestic  banks have access only to  domestic
savings as a source of loanable funds.  Section IV focused on the case of finan-
cial openness,  defined as a situation  in which foreign banks  (with lower costs
25of intermediation  and  a lower markup)  have unrestricted  access to  domestic
capital  markets.  We then measured the net cost of capital market  integration
by comparing  welfare losses under  financial autarky  and  financial openness.
We showed that  if the  interest  rate  facing the  country  is not  high,  financial
integration  may lead to a welfare gain, as a result of the fall in expected inter-
mediation  costs as well as the increase in the net surplus  of domestic  savers
attributed  to the higher interest  rate on saving.  However, if the interest  rate
facing the country  is high, it will render projects  unfeasible, leading to a loss
of the entire expected net income of domestic producers  surplus in that  state
of nature.  The  limited  enforcement  of contracts  prevents  the  financing  of
these  projects,  despite  the  fact that  they  may lead to  a large  expected  net
income.  thus,  financial integration  may lower welfare if the foreign interest
rate facing the economy under openness is more volatile relative to the degree
of volatility  of interest  rates  under  financial autarky.
The third  part  of the paper extended  the basic framework to consider the
case of an upward-slopping  domestic supply curve of funds, and the last part
considered  the  case in which the domestic  supply  curve of funds is upward-
sloping, projects  are ex ante heterogeneous,  and congestion externalities  pre-
vail.  Our analysis showed that  opening the economy to  unrestricted  inflows
of capital  may magnify the  welfare cost of existing  distortions.  In autarky,
the welfare cost  of the  distortion  (congestion externalities  in our example),
is, in a sense,  "contained"  by the limited  pool of domestic  saving.  However,
in a financially open economy, such distortions  are magnified by the inflow of
capital.  A similar assessment applies to other distortions,  such as the implicit
insurance  provided  by domestic  authorities,  as shown  by Aizenman  (1998)
in a related  framework in which moral hazard  is modeled explicitly.
The analysis developed here can be further extended  in various directions.
First,  in both  Asia and Latin America, financial volatility has prompted  poli-
cymakers to take various measures to strengthen  prudential  supervision, such
as imposing limits on the open foreign exchange position of commercial banks
26and  preventing  banks  from  making  foreign-currency  denominated  loans.17
Understanding  the extent  to which such measures may help reduce volatility
and the cost of financial openness remains,  however, to  be explored.  Second,
extending  the analysis to a multi-period  model would allow us to consider the
case where external  shocks (such as, for instance,  an  increase in the  cost  of
external  funds, or a higher perceived volatility  of shocks) would induce debt
rescheduling.  The  presence of a backward-bending  cost  of funds-borrowers
interest  rate  curve may imply multiple  equilibria,  where a given outstanding
stock of debt  is rescheduled  at a relatively low or high interest  rate.  In these
circumstances,  coordination  failure  mnay  lead  the economy to  the inefficient
equilibrium,  associated  with  the relatively  high interest  rate.
1 70f course, whether  some of these measures  can be viewed  as distinct from capital
controls  may be a matter of semantics.
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Bank  Spreads:  Domestic  vs. Foreign  Banks,  1988-95
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